![]() ![]() strategic nuclear weapons - an additional 450 nuclear warheads can be delivered by dual-capable aircraft. Here we concentrate on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which comprise over 80 percent of deployed U.S. Once authenticated, the president’s chosen option is transmitted by the Pentagon’s command center directly to the crews involved in carrying out the order.īesides making sure any launch order comes from the president, there are additional measures intended to stop unauthorized launch. If the codes match, this is taken as proof that the order is coming from the president, or the next surviving member of the chain of command. To order a nuclear strike, the president needs to crack open the nuclear biscuit - a laminated card carried by either the president or the president’s military aide - and provide the appropriate response to the sequence of letters read by the duty officer in the Pentagon’s military command center. Presidential authentication is another safeguard. For silo-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, permissive action links are unlocked before warheads are fitted onto their delivery bus. Permissive action links are intended to keep warheads and bombs safe during transit and storage, and to prevent unauthorized detonation by anyone who manages to get their hands on one. ![]() One of the first barriers is the permissive action link - a code that has to be correctly entered before the warhead arms. nuclear command and control architecture focuses on preventing unauthorized use prior to presidential authorization. Safeguards Against Unauthorized Nuclear Use In order to maintain robust command and control in a crisis, the United States should place less reliance on limited nuclear options. No command and control system can reconcile the adaptation and flexibility required by war with the tight control over nuclear weapons that is vital to preventing unauthorized launches and clearly signaling intentions to limit rather than increase the scale of conflict. As a result, after that first limited strike the danger of unauthorized launch is worse in crisis situations where controlling escalation is critical. But right of launch - immediately after the president’s first orders have been executed - the system is primed to allow additional strikes instead of resetting the launch codes or putting the launch keys back in their safes. The problem is they may have unintentionally done so already.Īmerica’s nuclear command and control system focuses on securing nuclear weapons until authentication of a president’s orders. While rushing toward their helicopter, he or she wonders what Russia’s next move will be and hopes they will not have to authorize additional nuclear strikes. president, in turn, authorizes a limited nuclear response just before being evacuated from the White House. Compensating for Russia’s perceived conventional inferiority, Russian commanders execute a limited nuclear strike - a small number of low-yield weapons intended to change conditions on the battlefield. ![]() Imagine a rapidly escalating conflict between Russian and NATO forces. ![]() His co-authors are grateful to his widow, Sally Blair, for permission to publish this article and list Bruce as a co-author. Editor’s Note: Bruce Blair passed away in July 2020. ![]()
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